We examine the impact and signaling effects that prefunding has on subsequent venture capital funding rounds. The seed funding gap is still a major obstacle for the initiation of new ventures. Crowdfinancing -an innovation in the market for startup finance -could be a possible market-based option to partly close this gap. However, crowdfinancing cannot be regarded as a substitute for venture capital or business angel funding, e.g. since it is not likely to fully finance a new venture over time. It therefore appears important to study the interaction between crowdfinancing and more traditional forms of startup finance. Drawing on a choice experimental design and data on 5,280 decisions of 120 venture investors, our results indicate that "the crowd" generally is a negative signal for professional venture investors, but that they do not ignore positive signals sent by the crowd. We find causal evidence that crowd-investing (securities-based crowdfunding) is in general regarded as highly negative by venture capitalists, while high sums of (reward-based) crowdfunding, collected fast by startups with a B2C business model, can have a positive effect on VC managers' funding decisions Our results also suggest that traditional forms of prefunding, i.e., prior business angel investments, by contrast significantly increase the likelihood of subsequent financing rounds. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.
Introduction
In 2012, Munich-based startup Smarchive (the producer of a semantic software that allows users to store, organize, and finish their paperwork; now called Gini) was in urgent need of capital for their expansion plans. Since the founders could not identify and negotiate with professional venture investors on a short notice, they decided to run a crowd-investing (equity-crowdfunding) campaign on Germany's then leading crowd-investing platform. They raised 100,000 Euro through 144 crowd investors in exchange for an aggregated 6% stake in equity. Three months later, Smarchive received an offer for a seven-digit funding round by a renowned corporate VC -however, this offer was conditional on termination of the crowdinvestment. Smarchive then offered up to a 25% premium payback on the investment sum if the crowd-investors retracted from their holding. Had only one of the 144 investors not agreed, 1 the deal would have been nil and void. 2 Around the same time Silicon-Valley-based startup Pebble Watch (the first major smartwatch project) faced a similar problem: after graduating from startup incubator Y-combinator the company was searching for follow-up funding but was rejected by venture capital firms. Admittedly as a last resort, founder Eric
Migicovsky had to turn to crowdfunding in April 2012. The original campaign to raise 100,000 Dollar through (reward-based) crowdfunding platform Kickstarter skyrocketed into more than $10-million by more than 68,000 contributors (in contrast to platform Seedmatch, Kickstarter did not have a fixed funding limit). The biggest problems Pebble Watch now faced were to build up production facilities for so many pre-ordered watches, and to decide between the VC companies which were now queuing to invest.
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These cases illustrate twofold: First, the seed funding gap is a major obstacle for the development of startups, since venture capitalists are increasingly specializing in financing later stage projects (see, e.g., Elitzur and Gavious, 2003b) . As a consequence, early stage ventures initially have to turn to other sources: in seed finance wealthy individuals, known as business angels, have taken their place (Elitzur and Gavious, 2003b) and recently a new form of early stage funding is growing: crowdfinancing. However, it is not likely that these financing forms are perfect substitutes for venture capital: Goldfarb et al. (2013) emphasis that when larger investments are needed, VC participation is generally necessary; even 1 The last investor to agree was a school boy who simply did not check his emails. Through social networks the founders contacted the coach of his handball team, who told the boy to answer. He agreed to Smarchive's offer on the last day prior to the deadline. 2 Source: Personal interviews with founders.
sophisticated angels are insufficient. The same holds true for crowdfinancing when you look at the majority of funding volumes. Besides capital, VCs provide important connections to other resources (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Ferrary and Granovetter, 2009) , which is why even startups without funding obstacles aim to attract venture capital.
Second, the presented cases also show that venture investors react (differently) towards pre-investments -a problem that has not been fully addressed by academic literature. While prior VC funding has been shown to positively affect the probability of getting more money (e.g., Lerner, 1994; Davila et al., 2003) , it is subject to great controversy, whether angel or crowd money also represents a positive informational value to subsequent financiers and therefore increases the likelihood of getting follow-up funding. For instance, supporters of crowdfinance say it can be interpreted as a positive signal of market acceptance by monitoring early adopter consumers' reactions, 4 whereas critical voices argue that turning to crowdfinancing indicates a failed "litmus test" of not being able to convince a reputed professional investor such as a business angel, and -in case of crowd-investing -an increased complexity in the governance of a startup (which was the case in the Smarchive example).
Likewise, regarding the direction of the informational value a prior business angel investment has for subsequent investors the academic literature comes to ambiguous findings. E.g., on the one hand Leavitt (2005) argues that a business angel prefunding signalizes complication to later VC investors due to an increasing wave of minority shareholder oppression claims in the US; found that startups that obtained angel funding subsequently obtain less venture capital financing, and vice versa, with a stronger effect for companies funded by less experienced angels. On the other hand Elitzur and Gavious (2003b) design a game-theoretical model according to which a prior angel investment ought to be a positive signal for potential VC investors, a finding that is supported by anecdotal evidence (at business angel conferences you frequently hear that "a good business angel is a very strong argument for a VC to invest"). Also, some VCs seem to rely on the proposals of their "business angel in residence" (Braun, 2013) . Case study evidence indicates that follow-up investors positively value (well-reputed) angels, while crowd-finance falls flat. Large scale empirical evidence on the causal effect of the prefunding situation of a new venture on subsequent financing rounds, however, lacks -which is in sharp contrast to the extensive literature on other startup characteristics influencing the choices of venture investors, such as 4 In the Pebble Watch case a managing partner of one of the VC funds that rejected the initial approach by the founder admitted that "venture capital always wants (…) to get validation, and with Kickstarter, he could prove there was a market"; retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/businesstechnology/canadians-smartwatch-startup-matches-record-15-million-in-vc-funding/article11965214/ founder team characteristics (Burton et al., 2002; Franke et al., 2008) , strategic alliances (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Stuart, 2000) , board composition (Certo, 2003) or patent portfolio (Conti et al., 2013a; Haeussler et al., 2012; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008 ). It appears important to answer this question, since -as stated before -VC money is no longer available in early stages, and startups without knowledge of the signaling effects of alternative funding options might obstruct their chances for VC funding at an early stage (especially since signals can not only be sent on purpose, but also unintentionally, see e.g., Janney and Folta, 2003) .
In order to address the research gap in empirical evidence we collected data on 5,280 investment decisions nested within 120 venture investors in a choice-experimental survey approach called choice-based conjoint analysis (CBC). This methodology has several advantages with regard to the research context: being a real-time data collection technique it overcomes the shortcomings of traditional post-hoc methods (e.g., questionnaires and interviews), which may suffer from people being poor at introspection, having difficulties to recall crucial aspects or being inclined to retrospectively rationalize decisions (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999) . Furthermore, CBC is particularly suitable to mimic the real choice situation of venture investors, namely the screening of business plans. Above all, being an experimental design, choice-based conjoint analysis makes causal inference a realistic goal, while real market data approaches might suffer from an endogeneity problem, e.g., because
high-quality startups may find it easier to both attract early funding and subsequent venture capital. Finally, it is able to produce statistically significant results even with a seemingly low sample size.
We find causal evidence that a prior business angel investment significantly increases the likelihood of a VC investment, in particular for B2B startups. The profile of the angel thereby plays an important role. Crowdfinancing, however, serves as a negative signal for subsequent funding decisions of venture capitalists, crowd-investing (securities-based crowdfunding) even more so than the reward-based variant. Yet, the interactions with a B2C business model and a relatively fast achievement of the funding goal, for example, increase the perceived utility of venture investors for a crowdfunded startup, indicating that while the crowd itself is a negative signal, it can send positive signals to which professional investors react in their decision processes.
The contributions of this study are both theoretical and practically relevant. It may contribute to several streams of academic literature: First, it can make an important contribution to the nascent literature on crowdfinance by shedding empirical light on its compatibility with traditional venture capital. Second, the research adds to the literature on venture capital selection criteria (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Hall and Hofer, 1993; MacMillan et al., 1985; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984) . Third, it extends the stream of research on the role of observable characteristics that signal a new venture's quality in VC financing (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Conti et al., 2013a; Hoenig and Henkel, 2015; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008) . Finally, by shedding light on how experts react to the evaluations of crowds, the study also contributes to the general literature on a broader understanding of management practices. Besides, the findings could have important implications for practitioners and public policy alike: they (1) contribute to the knowledge of capital seekers on VC selection criteria, (2) shed further light on critical success factors of startups, (3) provide an empirical basis for the investors community for comparing their own judgment to that of their peers, and (4) help public policy, which is demanding for scientific evidence on the new phenomenon crowdfinancing with regard to governmental support for entrepreneurial activities and regulatory perspectives. All in all, a better understanding of the role of prefunding as a decision policy of venture investors is desirable from a theoretical as well as from a practical perspective.
Theory and Context

Venture financing and entrepreneurial selection
The creation of new ventures is of pivotal importance for innovation-based economies (Schumpeter, 1942; Wennekers and Thurik, 1999) . One of the biggest obstacle for the founding of new enterprises is funding (see e.g., Hochberg et al., 2007; Cassar, 2004) . Since startup companies usually do not generate own profits and cannot offer any securities to credit lenders, they are reluctant to external sources of equity funding (Gelderen et al., 2005) .
Venture capitalists specialize in financing new ventures and are one of the most important external providers of equity for growth-oriented startups (Gompers and Lerner, 2004) . Their judgments are highly consequential to the survival of new ventures, as VCs not only provide startups with capital but also with monitoring and governance (Gompers and Lerner, 2004) , they facilitate access to additional resources for the firm (Baum and Silverman, 2004) , and are a door opener for networks of influence (Ferrary and Granovetter, 2009) . Venture capitalists fulfill a critical role in the innovation process of high technology ventures and thus serve as a catalyst for innovation within an economy (Shepherd et al., 2000) . The question of how these key gate keepers make decisions therefore plays a central role in the entrepreneurship literature -with first studies dating back to the 1970s (for an overview see Zopounidis, 1994) -and is of constantly high interest until today (Franke et al., 2008) . Knowledge on their decision policies not only helps startups seeking funding, but also -since venture capitalists generally are thought to be experts in predicting emerging firms' performance -their selection criteria are interpreted as success factors for new ventures (Riquelme and Rickards, 1992) .
Risk capital investments are characterized -by definition -by a high degree of uncertainty and a large difference between the knowledge of capital-seeking entrepreneurs and capital-providing investors about the true quality of a startup (Backes-Gellner and Werner, 2007; Busenitz et al., 2005; Gompers and Lerner, 2001) . Since the quality of a startup is not directly observable for them, venture investors tend to address this ex-ante asymmetric information problem by relying on signals of quality, that is attributes that are observable at the time of the investment decision and for which the probability is high that they correlate with the non-observable determinants of the quality of a startup (Hoenig and Henkel, 2015; Stuart et al., 1999) . In fact, VCs invest significant time and energy in the screening process and the evaluation of quality signals (Amit et al., 1990; Hall and Hofer, 1993) . Conversely, entrepreneurs invest in observable attributes which signal the quality of their startup (Zott and Huy, 2007) . Hence, when explaining entrepreneurial selection, signaling theory (Spence, 1973 (Spence, , 1974 ) is frequently applied. Various factors that might affect the choices of venture investors have already been extensively examined, among them patents (Conti et al., 2013a; Haeussler et al., 2012; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008) , entrepreneurial team composition and characteristics (Burton et al., 2002; Franke et al., 2008) , strategic alliances (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Stuart, 2000) , and board composition (Certo, 2003) . 5 Regarding the role of early-stage prefunding the literature is scarce.
In line with Spence's (1973 Spence's ( , 2002 definition, signals have to be observable as well as costly and discriminatory to be effective (Connelly et al., 2011) . Previous funding of a startup firm fulfills these requirements, since on the one hand ownership structure and financing resources are immediately visible from the business plan, and on the other, different types of prefunding, being differently costly to obtain, may be regarded as an observable proxy for communicating, e.g. the startup's ability to attract a market (in case of a crowdfinancing), or the management team's positive effort in identifying, approaching, negotiating and dealing with investment managers (Elitzur and Gavious, 2003a (Baum et al., 2000; Baum and Oliver, 1996; Stuart et al., 1999) , and that venture capitalists look for these endorsements when making funding decisions (Baum and Silverman, 2004) . Subsequent to the original quality signal by self-selection, third parties can thus create credible information serving as complementary reputational signals, in particular when high status players are willing to use their profile to back a venture (Shane and Cable, 2002; Stuart et al., 1999) . In fact, Bruton et al. (2009) (Colombo and Grilli, 2005) , early investors might serve as intermediaries who actively certificate their perceived quality of a startup to follow-up investors, e.g., by investing their own money. Interesting questions arising in that context are whether reputed business angels appear to provide a more credible endorsement than unknown angels or the anonymous crowd, or whether the sheer number of backers ("wisdom of the crowd" 6 ), may it be crowd-contributors or the size of a business angel consortium, influences VC selection.
In the context of startup financing, it is important to note that signals cannot only be sent on purpose but also unintentionally (see, e.g., Janney and Folta, 2003; Daily et al., 2005) .
While signaling theory following the seminal work by Spence (1973; 1974) emphasizes that signals need not (but can) be productive, founders might -by primarily seeking the productive function of seed funding, namely financial resources -send a quality signal to subsequent potential investors. Such an unintended signal may, too, communicate negative information to receivers (see, e.g., Ryan et al., 2000) .
Crowdfinancing
We use crowdfinancing as an umbrella term to distinguish between crowd-investing, which we define as the funding of a company (not only a project) by selling equity or hybrid financing instruments to many small investors, usually through an online platform, thereby investors obtain a right in future cash-flows (often also referred to as equity-crowdfunding, investment-based crowdfunding or securities-based crowdfunding), and crowdfunding, which we describe as an open call, essentially through the internet, for the provision of financial resources either in form of a donation or in exchange for some form of reward and/or prepurchase of a product/service, where contributors do not receive any securities. Similar definitions come from, e.g., Mollick (2014) conceivable that the US market will experience a similar shift towards securities-based crowdfunding once regulation allows it to a wider public.
The nascent literature on crowdfinancing so far focuses on describing the phenomena crowdfunding (e.g., Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2010; Agrawal et al., 2013; Belleflamme et al., 2014; Mollick, 2014) and securities-based crowdfunding (Ahlers et al., 2015; Hornuf and 7 Source: Fuer-gruender.de Crowdfinance-Monitor, retrieved from https://www.fuergruender.de/fileadmin/mediapool/Publikation/Crowdfinanzierung_Q1_2016__-_F%C3%BCr-Gr%C3%BCnder.de_Dentons.pdf 8 See e.g., http://www.investor.gov/news-alerts/investor-bulletins/investor-bulletin-crowdfunding-investors Schwienbacher, 2015; Vulkan et al., 2016) . Other studies have examined how project or firm characteristics, timing, geography and campaign dynamics influence backer contribution (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2011; Ahlers et al., 2015; Mollick, 2014) . Given its novelty studies on the interplay between crowdfinancing and traditional sources of venture capital are scarce. Recent work mainly applies observational data; e.g. Sorenson et al. (2016) find that an increase in successful crowdfunding campaigns within a geographic region corresponds with an increase in VC investments in the same area in the same year. Such approaches, even with firm level data, are likely to suffer from endogeneity, e.g., since a high-quality startup company will find it both easier to attract crowdfinancing and venture capital. Our study aims to close the research gap by applying a choice experimental approach which allows causal inference.
Data and method
Choice-based conjoint experiment and variables
In order to shed light on the role of prefunding in venture financing, a choice-based conjoint (CBC) experiment is conducted, an approach that is well established in entrepreneurship research. It is a multivariate, decompositional methodology of preference measurement that combines the data collection of conjoint approaches with the statistical analysis of discrete choice models. Riquelme and Rickards (1992) were the first to demonstrate that the decisionmaking of VCs can be modelled through conjoint analysis with a high degree of consistency. Shepherd and Zacharakis (1998) further proposed the methodology for entrepreneurship research, and they particularly recommended it for researching the decision policies of venture capitalists (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999) . Numerous conjoint studies have since been undertaken (e.g., Franke et al. 2008; Hoenig & Henkel 2012) and proven that "[c]onjoint analysis represents a robust technique for decision modeling research providing structured insight into VCs' decision policies" (Shepherd et al., 2003) .
In the online choice experiment 9 carried out here, participants are repeatedly (eleven times) presented with a set of three hypothetical startup profiles (each with varying factors regarding their prefunding situation and business model) and are asked to select their most and least preferred profile, i.e. the startup they are most likely and the one they are least likely to finance. Thereby, a complete ranking of the three alternatives is obtained. As a follow-up task for each choice set, respondents are directed to indicate whether they would actually invest in the startup they have selected as their most preferred. This so-called "dual-response none option" adds an extra portion of reality to the choice-based conjoint experiment since most startups get rejected in an early stage of an investment decision process (Dixon, 1991 ).
Yet, respondents are still forced to choose between the presented profiles, permitting a statistically efficient measurement of preferences as well as the estimation of knock-out values for an alternative's utility. By analyzing the decisions of venture investors (dependent variable) one can draw conclusions about the importance that respondents attach to the different attributes describing the decision scenarios (independent variables).
This approach is chosen mainly for three reasons: To begin with, conjoint analysis represents a concurrent method, thus the shortcomings of post-hoc methodologies are avoided (such as inconsistencies in how respondents interpret scales (see, e.g. Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999) , and VC decisions are often subject to cognitive biases (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Ferrary and Granovetter, 2009 ). Second, choice-based conjoint experiments come close to the real-life situation of venture investors selecting startups and represent a convenient survey method for subjects. The variable descriptions in the choice experiment are of the same nature as the object itself, namely its description in a business plan -a frequent critique, that the choice alternatives are unrealistic "paper ventures" (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999 ) is thereby overcome. Third, and probably the most essential feature of choice-based conjoint analysis is its experimental setting which allows causal inference. With a choice-experimental approach an omitted variable bias is excluded by construction, the desired signaling effect of a prefunding structure can be isolated experimentally, and ceteris paribus analyses are possible. Observational data approaches might suffer from an endogeneity problem, e.g., because high-quality startups may find it easier to both attract early funding and subsequent venture capital.
It is imperative to design the conjoint experiment as realistic and as understandable as possible. Thus, a real-life decision-making situation is reproduced which mimics the initial screening stage of an investment decision, in which VCs evaluate written (summaries of) business plans. In order to be able to interpret the results correctly, it is essential to make sure that all respondents have a common reference setting in mind. Therefore, at the beginning of the experiment, a general scenario is introduced. Respondents are asked to imagine that several hypothetical startups present their business plan to them in order to apply for funding.
A base business plan is shown, which serves as an equal background for all startups (e.g. all startups are described to be based on an innovative and scalable business idea and having a functioning protoype). By making it generally attractive with regards to market potential, founding team, clear value proposition and early key performance indicators, it is assured that investors indeed consider an investment. The composition is based on an extensive review of relevant academic literature on VC decision-making criteria and of practice-oriented literature, as well as on ten in-depth semi-structured expert interviews with venture investors.
By deriving the reference setting, selection of attributes, their relevance and level values 10 from both theory and interviewing, a maximum of external validity is achieved.
The startup profiles in the experiment are described by eight attributes which represent the independent variables ( utility. Regular design strategies would negatively influence estimation efficiency (Chrzan and Orme, 2000) , thus attributes are split into three hierarchies (Chrzan and Orme, 2000) : one common attribute (business model), that appears with each choice alternative independently of other attribute levels, one primary attribute (prefinancing type), on whose levels conditional attributes depend, and six conditional attributes which just appear with certain levels of primary attributes.
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A specific characteristic of choice-based conjoint experiments compared to traditional conjoint approaches is that two designs are needed: one to construct the profiles (like in traditional conjoint), and an additional to put these stimuli in various (here 11) choice sets (Haaijer and Wedel, 2007) . To reduce the full fractional design of possible combinations to a manageable number, we relied on the generation of choice sets and profiles as an efficient 10 In order to verify level values of crowdfinancing attributes an extensive analysis of prior crowdfinancing projects was conducted, too. 11 While the focus of our study is on the role prefinancing as a decision policy of venture investors we also asked survey participants to which extent which startup characteristics impact their funding decisions (they were asked to distribute 100 percentage points according to their subjective importance in a simple constant sum question). In line with other literature the most important selection criterion was said to be the founding team with a mean importance value of 32%. Prefunding conditions make up for 6.3% on average (6 th place) -only short after key performance indicators of the startup (9.3%) -with individual maxima of up to 30%(!). It is, however, questionable if such a self-reported question type is capable of correctly measuring the true preferences of respondents, e.g., since investors might lack insights in their decision processes, as mentioned beforehand.
fractional-factorial design in a computerized approach. Ten different complete designs (or questionnaire versions, respectively) are constructed and randomly assigned to participants leading to efficiency gains and avoiding biases. The whole survey had been repeatedly pretested by ten venture investors (different to the ones pre-interviewed) in presence of the researcher in order to obtain feedback and refine the survey design. The tests confirmed that the experimental setting is realistic, understandable and manageable in a reasonable time frame.
Data and sample
Our sample frame is venture capital managers who work at private venture capital companies Our sample consists of completed experiments from 120 venture investors (73 venture capitalists and 47 business angels), cumulating to a total of 5,280 data points nested within the 120 persons (each respondent answered 11 choice sets, making a best and a worst choice decision, yielding to a ranking of three alternatives, plus a follow-up decision on the noneoption within each choice set). The survey is still in the field, but the heretofore number of respondents can already be regarded as relatively satisfying, since achieving high response rates in surveys among venture investors is considered to be very difficult (Muzyka et al., 1996) . Generally, for studies with venture capitalists sample sizes as low as around 50 respondents are not uncommon (for an overview see e.g., Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999) .
Checking for non-response bias, we could not find any demographic differences between participating and non-participating venture capitalists, neither in terms of age, educational background, hierarchical position, VC experience, fund size, nor industry focus, making us confident that the sample is already representative of the German VC market (for descriptive statistics of the sample see table 2).
Behavioral model, derivation of choice probabilities and estimation
In the underlying experiment participants face choices from a limited number of options. The outcome (dependent) variable therefore is discrete, thus discrete choice models are to be used.
The goal of discrete choice models is to understand the behavioral process that leads to the agent's choice, thus a causal perspective is taken (Train, 2009) . It is presumed that respondents always choose the alternative with the highest utility value for them (utility maximization hypothesis, Ben-Akiva and Boccara, 1995). Another fundamental assumption of discrete choice analysis is that from the observed choices the underlying utility function of respondents can be derived (the stimuli are interpreted as utility, Train, 2009 ). For choicebased conjoint analyses utility functions are derived as random utility models with an additive part-worth function preference model (Hair et al., 2010) .
Discrete choice analysis consists of two interrelated tasks: specification of the behavioral model and estimation of the parameters of that model. As behavioral models we employ (extended) logit models, which are by far the most widely used discrete choice models (Train, 2009 ). As described above, in our choice-experimental design we ask respondents to identify the best and the worst out of three alternatives. Since the not chosen alternative can be interpreted as the middle-rank, we thereby obtain a complete ranking of the choice set. 13 Thus a rank-ordered logit model, also referred to as exploded logit, (Beggs et al., 1981; Chapman and Staelin, 1982) can be employed. Following Train (2009) the rank-ordered logit decomposes ("explodes") each ranking of all alternatives into several independent pseudo-choices: it assumes that the first alternative is chosen from the whole choice set, reducing the choice set for the next choice by one. In the next round, another choice is made, eliminating another alternative. This is continued until one alternative remains.
To illustrate, consider a decision-maker who is presented a choice set of three alternatives A, B, C, where he/she identifies A as the best and C as the worst option (leaving the second rank for B). Conditional on , the probability of a respondent's ranking is a product of logit formulas: the logit probability of choosing A from set A, B, C, times the logit probability of choosing B from the remaining alternatives B, C. The mathematical expression of the probability P that individual n ranks the alternatives accordingly is:
where is a vector containing the observed properties of choice alternative j, and is a vector containing the respondents' part-worths .
Since participants are asked to answer eleven choice tasks, the equation needs be generalized to allow for repeated choices by each respondent. The probability of respondent to rank alternatives in order A, B, C in choice situation over a sequence of T choices is: are not in the choice set (Louviere and Woodworth, 1983) . In other words: adding or subtracting choice options to/from the existing set, or changing characteristics from a third option, should not affect the odds between any two options. Practically, when alternatives are close substitutes the IIA assumption may be inappropriate. A third and particular problem for conjoint experiments is that the IIA property is quite unrealistic with repeated choice data owing to preference heterogeneity (Fischer and Henkel, 2013) : "a person who puts greater value than the average respondent on a specific alternative in the first choice, will also put greater value on a similar alternative in subsequent choices (Hausman and Wise, 1978) , leading to a correlation among the error terms", consequently violating the IIA assumption.
Extensions of standard logit models, such as the mixed logit (McFadden and Train, 2000) , relax the undesirable IIA assumption by estimating individual part-worth vectors, thereby accommodating preference heterogeneity. It is therefore the preferred model for the underlying choice experiment.
The mixed logit is a generalization of the standard logit model, hence every standard logit model can be approximated by a mixed logit (McFadden and Train, 2000) . The (unconditional) mixed logit probability P of observing a certain sequence of rankings is the integral of the product of all standard logit probabilities over the density of part-worth parameters (here assumed to follow a normal distribution 14 ):
where describes the density of , with specifying the distribution. Hence, the choice probability is a weighted average of the logit equation (called "mixed function") evaluated at different values of the individual part-worth parameters , with the weights given by the density of the part-worths (called "mixing distribution"). Such a model is also called rankordered mixed logit (see, e.g., Hoenig and Henkel, 2015) .
For the reasons given above the mixed logit is not only currently the state-of-the-art behavioral model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) , but also particularly suitable for estimating choice-based conjoint data. A drawback of mixed logit models, however, concerns its estimation, which is more complex than that of standard logit models: since the log-likelihood 14 Part-worth densities can follow any distribution, for this study, s are assumed to follow a normal distribution, in congruence with Fischer and Henkel (2013) and Hoenig and Henkel (2015) . The rationale is -besides the practical usability -that most professional investors are assumed to have part-worths that are close to their peer group's mean, yet outliers far from the mean (like investors with exotic preferences) are possible.
function to be maximized does not have a closed form solution, simulation procedures have to be used for approaching a solution, namely simulated maximum likelihood (see e.g. Revelt and Train, 1999) and Hierarchical Bayes (HB) (see e.g., Allenby et al., 1995; Train, 2009; Frühwirth-Schnatter et al., 2004) . 15 The latter is assumed to be advantageous first and foremost because of its ability to provide estimates of individual part-worths given only a few choices by each individual. It can do so by "borrowing" information from population information describing the preferences of other respondents in the dataset; it thus estimates two parameter sets: an individual's part worth vector on the individual ("lower") level, and the distributional parameters b and W on the population ("upper") level -that is also why it is called "hierarchical" (Train, 2009 (Lenk et al., 1996) . Finally, HB usually outperforms classical individuallevel, aggregate-level, and latent-class models in part-worth recovery and predictive accuracy (Orme, 2010; Andrews et al., 2002) , making a compelling argument for Hierarchical Bayes estimation.
Results
Our statistical analysis draws on 44 decisions each from 120 individuals, hence yielding to a total of 5,280 data points. These data points, however, are not independent as each set of 44 observations is nested within an individual venture investor. And mental models differ between individuals, therefore, as indicated above, a mixed logit behavioral model (as in equation 3.3) and Hierarchical Bayes estimation (HB) are the applications of choice. Table 3 presents our results of this HB estimation in addition to simple maximum likelihood estimation (ML) of a rank-ordered logit model (refer to equation 3.2). For the ML estimation we display for each evaluation criterion (attribute level) the part-worth utility estimate (beta coefficient), the corresponding standard error, the t-ratio and level of significance, indicated by the asterisks. The results show that, even in the (less powerful) ML estimation, all main effects (and all interactions of attribute business model with all types of prefinancing, except for level "no prefunding" and "unknown business angel") are significantly used by venture investors in assessing startups for their funding decision. Column 2 of table 3 displays aggregated (mean individual) coefficient estimates of the Hierarchical Bayes estimation.
Since Bayesian estimators are not point estimators, no levels of frequentist significance are reported. To nonetheless give a sense of central tendency, distributional parameters are calculated across all 120 individual part-worth utilities, namely standard deviation, standard errors and confidence intervals.
---------------------------------Insert Table 3 about here ----------------------------------
Relative part-worth coefficients, are presented in effects-coding, i.e., the values are scaled to be centered around zero, thus it is a zero-sum game within each attribute. Hence, the main effect of a level is its impact compared to the average effect of all levels and corresponds to the classical definition of a main effect (Kugler et al., 2012) . 16 For reasons of clarity we left out the counter-level of dummy variables; their value is not zero but the negative reverse of the indicated reference level. The summed-up part-worth utilities of one level per attribute across all attributes make the total utility of a full profile (here a start-up company). If the total utility exceeds the value of the NONE threshold, then such a start-up profile is more likely to be considered for an investment than to be immediately rejected (as indicated by respondents in the follow-up question).
In order to interpret coefficients correctly it is important to recall two general properties of discrete choice models (Train, 2009 ): since they are interval scaled, only differences in utility matter, the levels and ratios of utility are irrelevant; and the overall scale of utility is irrelevant, multiplying each alternative's utility by a constant likewise does not change the agent's choice (e.g. the ML results could be scaled to be in the ranges of the HB   table) . 16 Other rationales in favor of effects coding are that the interpretation of interaction effects becomes easier due to the aforementioned orthogonality of attribute levels. Also, using effects coding is indispensable for studies with conditional attributes that do not appear in each choice alternative: the average effect of an attribute has to be zero so that it does not bias utility by mere appearance or absence within an alternative.
Concentrating on HB estimation results indicate that the most preferred source of prefunding of venture investors is business angels, with estimated betas being significantly higher for business angels they know and appreciate (3.489) than for business angels they do not know (0.861); in fact it is the highest difference in utility between any two succeeding prefunding types in the preference order. A prior crowdfinancing significantly decreases the likelihood of a VC to invest in a startup, crowd-investing (-2.246) even more so than the nonequity based variant crowdfunding (-1.140). With all other variables at their mean (that is zero in effects-coding), both crowdfinancing types cause participating investors to reject a start-up alternative for further consideration, since their part-worth utilities lie under the nonethreshold (-0.389). Even no prefunding at all is on average regarded as more positive than any form crowdfinancing (-0.965), despite the fact that, in general, high prefunding sums are preferred over low sums. It deserves mentioning, though, that the confidence intervals for crowdfunding and no prefunding overlap, that means we cannot reject with 95 percent certainty that the population average of venture investors might prefer crowdfunding over no prior funding. Regarding the configurations of prefunding few investors and even more so high investment sums generally increase the likelihood of a startup to be selected as best. In case of a crowdfinancing fast collection of the target sum provides a positive utility.
We hypothesized that interactions exist between a startup's business model (target customers) and its prefunding source, i.e. combining a certain prefunding type with a certain business model has a different utility for venture investors than the simple sum of the two main effect utilities of the respective levels. Besides the theoretical justification presented above the following tests show that the inclusion of interactions between levels of attributes prefinance and business model also make sense from a statistical point of view: 17 firstly, the interactions significantly improve the model fit in terms of log-likelihood, secondly, an additional 2 log-likelihood test is significant ( ²(4)=10.110; p<0.039), and thirdly there is a 0.17% gain in McFadden's pseudo-R² over the main effects only model. Finally, the rankordered logit maximum likelihood estimation (cf. table 3(1)) finds that interactions between business model and known and appreciated business angel(s) and business model and crowdinvesting are highly statistically significant at the 0.01 level or 0.05 level, respectively, and that the interaction between business model and crowdfunding is weakly significant at the 0.1 level. No interaction was assumed between prefinancing's level no funding and business model, and indeed no statistically significant interaction effect is found.
17 Note that the tests are computed using aggregate logit estimation but can also serve as a useful guide for considering whether interaction effects perform well within HB estimation.
Our results are robust to controlling for types of investors in our sample. Since one of our core findings is that a prior business angel funding increases and a prior crowdfinancing decreases the likelihood of obtaining a subsequent financing by professional investors, one could argue that -as funding is usually staged and new firms often need various rounds of financing (see, e.g., Colombo and Grilli, 2005) -the positive signal of a business angel investment could offset the negative signal of an early crowdfinancing. This argument would, however, only hold true, if business angels had a less negative perception of crowdfinancing than venture capitalists (indeed, Kerr et al. (2014) show that VCs and business angels feature distinguishing investment habits). Table 4 splits our results into separate samples for VCs and business angel (as proposed by Hoetker, 2007) . A comparison of utility coefficients reveals that venture capitalists and business angels have similar relative preferences for crowdfinancing and business angels as sources of prefunding (in fact, business angels even have a higher utility for no funding relative to crowdfinancing). 18 It can therefore not be concluded that a crowdfunded startup could easily increase its likelihood of venture capital financing by interposing a business angel, since the crowdfinancing also decreases the likelihood of angel financing.
Discussion
Summary, interpretation and contribution
By analyzing choice decisions of venture investors we gain insights how prefunding conditions of startup companies shape the likelihood of receiving subsequent venture capital.
Our experimental design allows us to draw causal conclusions. We can disentangle three major findings regarding the signaling effects of pre-financing on venture managers' selection process. Firstly, VCs rely on business angels. The endorsement by (semi-)professional rich individual investors is a strong investment signal for venture capitalists. The profile of preinvested business angels thereby plays a tremendous role; however, even angels unknown to the decision-maker increase the likelihood of a subsequent financing round. The positive impact of angel investors known to the decision-maker is more pronounced for companies 18 Comparison of means by t-tests confirm significant results.
with a B2B business model, indicating that renowned angels -usually expected to have a strong professional network in the industry they are investing in -might also be seen as a potential resource for startups.
Secondly, a prior crowdfinancing negatively impacts the evaluation of a startup by professional venture investors. The "crowd" is being regarded as so negative that ceteris paribus even no prefunding at all would increase the likelihood of being selected, despite our finding that VCs generally prefer more prefunding in terms of investment sums. There is evidence for two reasons that seem to explain this negative signaling effect of crowdfinancing: On the one hand VCs might associate a negative selection bias, i.e. bad quality startups select themselves into crowdfinancing. Oftentimes a startup company does not have the option to choose "no pre-financing", it simply needs seed-funding in order to become "VC ready" (see above). Having to turn to either variant of crowdfinancing might be seen as a failed litmus test of not finding a business angel willing to invest. It is thereby assumed the crowd has a higher likelihood of funding (bad quality) projects than professional investors. Mollick and Nanda (2014) find evidence that the crowd is willing to fund projects that experts may not. We have also found support for this view in the aforementioned interviews: an experienced VC assumes that "only those teams apply for crowd-investing who are too lazy to discuss and negotiate with professional investors, or who got rejected"; another interviewed investor becomes even more explicit regarding the rejection hypothesis, stating that "every startup that comes on the crowdfunding platforms these days, I have already seen on my desk one year ago. It's a negative selection bias!" Our finding, that crowd-investing is evaluated as even more negative than crowdfunding corresponds with the view that VCs perceive crowd money as a negative signal for a startup's overall quality due to selection bias, since, as Agrawal et al. (2013) argue: "creators with high-quality inventions may have little incentive to employ equity-crowdfunding", when they can also collect a donation or rewardbased crowdfunding. This goes in line with signaling theory: the signaling cost differential (Spence, 1973) is arguably smaller for crowdfinancing than for business angels.
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On the other hand, an additional explanation for the skepticism towards crowdfinancing is that it might signal complexity in the future governance of a startup to subsequent investors. In our interviews with professional investors a frequent issue was the pooling of contributors ("there's a problem if you have 1,000 people to talk to"); VCs fear that the more people involved, the higher the probability that one puts a spanner in the works.
This goes in line with our finding that fewer backers result in a higher utility VCs assign to a startup. A different potential explanation for the latter finding could be that a startup option specified with fewer funders, and therefore with higher individual investment sums (owing to the ceteris paribus analysis of our experimental setting), might signal higher individual commitment. However, this is unlikely to fully explain the positive part-worth utility of few investors because of the following: when splitting up the attribute number of crowd contributors to account for the two variants of crowdfinancing separately (refer to table 5 in the appendix), the part-worth utility for many crowd-investors (-2.460) is by large more negative as for crowd-investings with few investors (-1.209 ), while at the same time the utility part-worths for few (-0.572 ) and many crowdfunders in case of a crowdfunding (-0.691) are not significantly different from each other. This clearly shows that VCs (only) devalue a large crowd if it holds securities and therefore might interfere in the governance of a company. That holds true for both crowd-investing and business angels: pre-investments by consortia of ten angels result in a significantly lower part-worth utility than by single business angels (-0.383).
To conclude, professional venture investors seem to rather show "fear of the crowd" than to follow herding behavior.
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Yet, a third implication of our research is that despite the crowd generally being a negative signal in their selection process, professional investors do not ignore positive signals sent by the crowd. The positive interaction effect between crowdfinancing and B2C startups indicates that professional investors assign some power of validation to the crowd, since it is assumed that laypeople are better in assessing B2C than B2B business models. Also, since crowd backers are assumed to be consumers, their positive appraisal of B2C companies might be seen as a proof of market acceptance for a startup's offering. In that context it is worth noting that our sample VCs do not see the crowd money as a mere early turnover for preordered products or services, which can be seen from the fact that the interaction effect is even more pronounced between crowd-investing and business model than between crowdfunding and business model (as only the latter also stands for pre-purchasing funding models). Furthermore, the increased likelihood of a VC investment with an increased speed of a prior successful crowdfinancing campaign -which has no inherent value for follow-up investors -makes a compelling argument for the conclusion that professional investors react 20 That in opposite to the investing behavior of crowd contributors who react to herding as several studies found out (see e.g. Agrawal et al. 2013). to signals sent by the crowd. The impact of these signals is significant: under the above mentioned circumstances venture investors are more likely to invest in a B2C startup with a prior crowdfunding than in the exact same startup that has received the same amount of prefunding from business angels, despite the strong general preference for business angel prefunding. 21 All in all our research indicates that prefunding by a business angel serves as a positive signal, that a crowdfinancing is a negative signal, and that signals sent by the crowd are taken into consideration in venture capitalists' startup selection processes.
From a theoretical perspective, this study makes several contributions. First, it can make an important contribution to the nascent literature on crowdfinancing by shedding light on its compatibility and interaction with venture capital. Second, our findings contribute to the understanding of previous research on venture capital selection criteria (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Hall and Hofer, 1993; MacMillan et al., 1985; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984) .
The impact and role of prefunding has not been addressed systematically by previous empirical research, this study therefore complements existing theoretical research (e.g. Elitzur and Gavious, 2003b) . It may thereby elucidate the ongoing debate of the effect of prior angel investments on VC selection (e.g. Hellmann and Thiele, 2015) . Third, it extends the stream of research on signaling in VC financing (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Conti et al., 2013a; Hoenig and Henkel, 2015; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008) . For the first time -to our knowledgethe signaling effects of a venture's prefunding are investigated in an approach that allows causal inference. By shedding light on how experts react to the judgments of crowds, the study may also contribute to a broader understanding of management practices.
Limitations and future research
There are a number of limitations of the research instrument that have to be kept in mind when interpreting results. Decisions made in a choice experiment are never actual investment choices (revealed preferences), but only stated preferences (see e.g., Train, 2009 ). An aspect particularly relevant to the decision policies of venture investors is that VCs often make judgments about a new startup in relation to their existing portfolio, while CBC requests isolated choices (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999) . However, this aspect is likely to be more relevant for startup characteristics concerning their industry and market; how they got funded seems to be less relevant with regard to e.g. portfolio diversification. Further, one needs to consider that CBC experiments are just simplified models of real-life decision-making. E.g.
only a limited number of attributes can be included in the choice design (Mitchell and Shepherd, 2010) , while in real-life other criteria than prefunding certainly play a role, too.
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Yet, as mentioned above, CBC does not suffer from an omitted variable bias since all not included variables are set equal in a reference scenario (Hoenig and Henkel, 2015) . The most frequent criticism conjoint analysis faces -that it lacks external validity owing to the choice situation not being realistic -is overcome in our research context due to the above mentioned reasons that the choice task in the experiment mimics the initial stage of real-life funding decision-making situation quite well. External validity was also reassured by extensive pretesting which confirmed that the experimental setting is realistic, understandable and manageable. In sum, despite the boundaries choice-experiments appear to be particularly suitable to expose which pre-financing conditions determine the investment decisions of investors.
The analysis presented in this paper is on an aggregate level. However, it is likely that 
Conclusion
Our study shows that venture capitalists' selection process is affected by the prefunding a new 
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